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THE ROLE OF THE DEMOCRATIC AND
REPUBLICAN PARTIES AS ORGANIZERS
OF SHADOW INTEREST GROUPS
Jonathan R. Macey*
Political parties are one of the most poorly understood components
of American political life. Neither political scientists nor economists
have explained adequately what political parties are and what they do.
Generally speaking, political scientists underestimate the significance
of political parties, while economists mischaracterize the role that they
play.
This article advances a new theory to explain the relationship be-
tween political parties and interest groups. Among the as yet unan-
swered questions that I resolve are: (1) why many politicians - both
Republicans and Democrats - develop a reputation for "party loy-
alty" despite the parties' inability to employ any meaningful sanctions
against politicians who deviate from the party line; (2) why candidates
for public office run in contested primaries when running as an in-
dependent generally would be a less costly mechanism for getting on
the ballot; (3) why the two major U.S. political parties continue to
attract resources from contributors and to inspire loyalty among vari-
ous groups despite an apparent decline in party strength as shown by
split-ticket voting, contested primaries, and a growing lack of ideologi-
cal cohesion within party platforms.
I argue that at times the costs of organizing into interest groups
will outweigh the benefits for certain groups of individuals. Political
parties enable these unorganized interest groups to find expression in
the political process at relatively low cost. My model of the two major
political parties depicts such parties as political brokerage firms. The
objective of these intermediaries is to increase their value to the politi-
cians and potential politicians who serve as their clients. The parties
do this by serving as arbitrageurs who signal politicians of citizens'
preferences and thereby inform politicians about how to obtain polit-
ical support. This matching process lowers the transaction costs to
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certain citizens of entering the political process. By expanding the set
of individuals who think they can influence government, political par-
ties enlarge the range of interests that can find expression through gov-
ernment action, and expand the aggregate political support available
to politicians.
Current models of the political process view the world as divided
into two groups: highly organized special interest groups on the one
hand, and totally disorganized, atomistic voters on the other.1 My
model expands the set by adding an intermediate form of political or-
ganization - the shadow interest group. I introduce the concept of
shadow interest groups to show that the world of politics does not
divide neatly into highly organized interest groups and highly disag-
gregated voters. In fact, dozens of intermediate sorts of organizational
forms fall between these two polar extremes.2 Shadow interest groups
occupy a middle ground between true interest groups and individual
voters. Shadow interest groups are different from true interest groups
in that they lack formal organizational structure. Shadow interest
groups are different from ordinary voters because, like members of for-
mal interest groups, their policy preferences are almost exclusively tied
to a particular set of issues. Such shadow interest groups do not organ-
ize into formal interest groups because the costs of organizing out-
weigh the benefits.3 Political parties serve the valuable role of
1. See, e-g., Denzau & Munger, Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests
Get Represented, 80 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 89, 90-92 (1986); Tollison, Public Choice and Legisla.
tion, 74 VA. L. REV. 339, 363-64 (1988).
2. Mancur Olson, Douglas Keenan, and Paul Rubin have made important contributions to
public choice literature by exploring the extent to which potential interest groups can affect the
regulatory process. Olson developed the concept of latent interest groups, which are groups with
similar interests that lack the system of selective sanctions and incentives necessary to become
effective in the political marketplace. M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 48-52,
132-35 (1965). Keenan and Rubin observe that some interest groups, which currently have no
members and no people who identify with them, would be able to coalesce into an effective
political coalition if politicians were to take certain actions deleterious to their interests. Keenan
and Rubin describe these groups as "shadow interest" groups. Keenan & Rubin, Shadow Interest
Groups and Safety Regulation, 8 INTL. REv. L. & ECON. 21-22 (1988). The description advanced
by Keenan and Rubin and by Olson envisions groups that, because of various constraints and
disincentives, are not currently organized into an effective political coalition. By contrast, the
shadow interest group I describe is an active political force that provides political support to
politicians in exchange for regulatory forbearance.
3. M. OLSON, supra note 2, at 47-50; Keenan & Rubin, supra note 2, at 22. As will be seen,
some interest groups evolve into formal political coalitions while others remain shadow interest
groups for two principal reasons. First, some interest groups face higher start-up costs than
others. Some groups, like the labor unions and the American Bar Association, have independent
reasons for galvanizing into a formal organizational structure. For these groups, the marginal
costs of organizing into a formal interest group will be quite low. Other groups, like members of a
particular religion or sexual orientation, lack any independent basis for formally organizing.
Such groups are shadow interest groups because they exist independently of a formal organiza-
tional structure. Second, some interest groups will prefer shadow status to formal status because
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increasing the political effectiveness of members of shadow interest
groups.
Political parties serve the needs of these quasi-interest groups in a
variety of ways.4 First, political parties lower the information costs
that shadow interest groups face when attempting to identify viable
candidates whose policy preferences match their own. Second, because
it is more costly for politicians to forge ties with shadow interest
groups than with formally organized interest groups, political parties
benefit politicians by providing a lower-cost alternative means of creat-
ing ties to these groups. In addition, political parties benefit politicians
by providing them with information about the preferences of shadow
interest groups. This information enables politicians to identify more
precisely the opportunity costs associated with the passage of particu-
lar legislation.
My argument is not that political parties serve shadow interest
groups exclusively and provide no services at all to organized interest
groups. Rather, my argument is that the political parties' ability to
serve organized interest groups has been declining steadily over time
because such groups have gained direct access to politicians and no
longer need political parties to serve as intermediaries. To survive,
political parties have had to expand their traditional constituency to
include shadow interest groups. Political parties do, however, provide
one important service for both formal interest groups and shadow in-
terest groups: they provide a mechanism by which politicians can
make credible (bonded) promises to these groups.
Despite the increasing ability of formal interest groups to obtain
direct access to politicians, political parties aid these groups by in-
creasing the durability and reliability of the bargains they strike with
politicians. It is well known that interest groups and politicians who
wish to enact interest legislation face severe nonsimultaneity of per-
formance problems.5 Political support generally is given by interest
groups to politicians prior to the time when such groups need political
favors from the politicians. Consequently, both politicians and interest
groups constantly are searching for ways to improve the credibility
formally organized interest groups face the specter of rent extraction. See infra notes 69-71 and
accompanying text for a more complete discussion of rent extraction.
4. I use the terms "quasi-interest group" and "shadow interest group" interchangeably. As
Michael Munger quite correctly has observed, the term should be "interest quasi-group" not
quasi-interest group, since what is "quasi" is not their interest but their status as a group. I
persist in using the term quasi-interest group only because I think it less awkward.
5. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of Market Exchange, 74
CORNELL L. REv. 43, 53 (1988).
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associated with the rent-seeking process. 6 Political parties are one
means for improving the reliability of interest group bargains. By de-
veloping a reputation for loyalty to a particular political party, a poli-
tician can make a credible commitment to interest groups. In this way
political party affiliation serves a function similar to that played by
ideological commitment, that is, increasing the credibility of candi-
dates' preelection promises.
Perhaps the two most important observations one can make about
American political parties are: (1) virtually no meaningful ideological
issues divide the two major parties; and (2) despite this lack of ideolog-
ical difference, certain groups, such as Jews and blacks, and of course
the infamous "silent majority," tend to associate themselves dispro-
portionately with one political party or the other. Increasingly, the
efforts of political parties are being directed toward identifying issues
that will enable them to attract and retain the support of such shadow
interest groups. Political parties not only help the voters who are
members of these shadow interest groups to identify the politicians
they are likely to prefer, they also provide politicians with information
about the nature of these groups and about their preference functions.
It is the thesis of this article that political parties solve a variety of
contracting problems that shadow interest groups face when they at-
tempt to become involved in the political process. The political parties
screen candidates for shadow interest groups in order to make sure
that they are electable and reliable. After election, the parties facilitate
the enforcement of politicians' promises to shadow interest groups,
and they shield such interest groups from the costs associated with
rent-extraction.
Until now, models of interest group behavior have treated all inter-
est groups alike, regardless of whether they are formally organized
(like the Teamsters or the American Bar Association) or not. Under
my theory, political parties serve as the vehicle by which less formally
organized interest groups make their views known. Other sorts of
political organizations, like Political Action Committees (PACs),
serve the interests of the formally organized interest groups, but polit-
ical parties provide a unique service to shadow interest groups.
In Part I of this article, I explain and critique the role attributed to
political parties by political scientists. Surprisingly, political scientists
6. Rent-seeking is an attempt to obtain economic "rents," which are payments for the use of
an economic asset in excess of its market price, through government intervention in the market.
A classic example of rent-seeking is an attempt by an industry group to obtain restrictions on
foreign imports of the goods manufactured by its members. The increased profits obtained from
such restrictions is economic "rent" from government regulation.
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agree about the function of political parties from both a positive as
well as a normative perspective. On the positive side, political scien-
tists believe that political parties are declining in importance. The
dominant view is that political parties no longer play an important
role in American political life. The debate on this issue, to the extent
there is one, focuses on the magnitude of the decline rather than on its
existence. On the normative side of the ledger, political scientists re-
gard the decline of political parties as an unfortunate event. The de-
cline is seen as a serious threat to democratic values, as is the decline
of party organizations and party identification among voters.
I turn in Part II to the treatment of political parties under the
economic theory of regulation. Scholars working in this genre take one
of three approaches to political parties. One important school of
thought ignores political parties altogether and formulates models of
political behavior as though parties did not exist. Another school
treats political parties as suppliers of brand names that provide voters
with low cost sources of information about candidates. A final ap-
proach treats political parties as umbrella organizations for a variety
of interest groups. Part II demonstrates that, while each of these ac-
counts contains important kernels of truth, none provides a complete
account of the role of political parties.
In Parts III and IV, I present my theory of political parties. Under
my theory, political parties are not political organizations that attempt
to influence government. Rather, the parties are viewed first as a
unique form of political brokerage firm that reduce the transaction
costs to certain individuals of organizing into effective political coali-
tions, and second as a substitute for ideology in signalling politicians'
future behavior on issues of importance. In other words, political par-
ties act as brokers between candidates for public office on the one hand
and shadow and formal interest groups on the other.
In Part V, I make some preliminary observations about the norma-
tive implications of my theory before concluding in Part VI.
I. THE POLITICAL SCIENTISTS' APPROACH TO POLITICAL PARTIES
Political scientists are remarkably united in the view that political
parties are declining in importance.7 The consensus dates from at least
as far back as 1950, when the Committee on Political Parties of the
7. "In a world in which political scientists disagree on almost everything, there is a remark-
able agreement among the political science profession on the proposition that the strength of
American political parties has declined significantly over the past several decades." Orren, The
Changing Styles ofAmerican Party Politics, in THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES:
THE CHALLENGE OF GOVERNANCE 31 (J. Fleishman ed. 1982).
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American Political Science Association observed that changes in the
social and economic structure of the United States required a focus on
national issues that political parties were unable to provide.8 Cornelius
P. Cotter and John F. Bibby have summarized the prevailing wisdom
with the observation that
[plolitical scientists, pushing the concept of electoral realignment to the
limits of its logic and working from the methodological strength of sur-
vey and attitudinal research, have formulated and tested a theory of poli-
tics that leads them to conclude that American political parties are in
steady decline and may verge upon extinction. The electorate's declining
commitment to party, the apparent lessened interest of activists in party
organization, and the salience of personality and issue over party loyalty
are indicators of party decline.9
Echoing this view, Theodore Lowi has argued that political parties
have become largely irrelevant and has expressed concern over the
parties' continual drift toward the periphery of national politics. 10 Pro-
fessor Lowi has argued that President Eisenhower's nomination as the
Republican party's candidate for the presidency and his election to
that office in 1952 marked the beginning of the decline of party politics
in two significant ways. First, it represented the first time that the can-
didate who was the favorite of the party machinery (Senator Robert
Taft) failed to win the nomination.1 Second, Eisenhower's electoral
victory over Adlai Stevenson marked the first time that a successful
presidential campaign was organized and run independently of the
party machinery.12 Similarly, Lowi points out that recent presidential
candidates from both parties have been selected from outside the party
structures, and split-ticket voting as well as contested primaries have
been rising consistently for the previous fifty years, indicating the de-
creasing significance of party affiliations.' 3 And it seems clear that na-
tional political parties have been less influential in controlling
presidential campaigns, dispensing federal patronage, and controlling
presidential nominations than at any time in our history.
8. Committee on Political Parties, Toward a More Responsible Th'o-Party System, 44 AM.
POL. Sci. REv. 1, 34 (Supp. 1950).
9. Cotter & Bibby, Institutional Development of Parties and the Thesis of Party Decline, 95
POL. SCi. Q. 1 (1980). Cotter and Bibby argue that political parties are in decline when viewed
from this perspective. But, consistent with the view espoused in this article, Cotter and Bibby
find that the national parties are increasing in strength in terms of the discipline they are exerting
over state and local organizations, their enforcement of rules, and their provision of organiza-
tional services and administrative activities. Id. at 1-2.
10. T. LowI, THE PERSONAL PRESIDENT: POWER INVESTED, PROMISE UNFULFILLED 71(1985).
11. Id. at 71-73 (1984).
12. See id. at 71-72.
13. See id at 73-79.
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In the same vein, in his classic work on the American Political
Tradition, Richard Hofstader observed that "party differences have
rarely been profound." Hofstader went on to note the "profound uni-
formity between Republican and Democratic principles."'14
A. The Survival of Political Parties
In this section, I contend that political scientists mischaracterize
the role played by political parties. I also argue that once the role
played by political parties is properly understood, it is clear that their
role is not declining, but merely evolving to serve a different set of
voters.
Political scientists have failed to explain at least three salient facts
about American political parties. First, despite political science pro-
nouncements that parties are unimportant and powerless, the two ma-
jor parties have survived and prospered. The Democratic and
Republican parties have survived intact since the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, 15 strongly suggesting that these parties are providing something
of value to politicians and interest groups.
Second, political parties are able to raise and distribute increas-
ingly large sums of money in campaigns, also suggesting that political
parties are not on the decline.' 6 For example, between 1977 and 1984,
the Republican party increased the amount of money raised in federal
elections by a factor of three. The Democratic party increased the
amount of money it raised by an even greater factor. 17 Similarly, the
total amount spent by the two major political parties in federal elec-
tion contests is even greater than the amount of money spent by Polit-
ical Action Committees (PACs) in such contests.'
Finally, the dominant view of political parties held by political
14. R. HOFSrADER, THE AMERICAN PoLrricAL TRADITION 231 (Vintage Books ed. 1974).
15. The Republican Party came into existence in 1854. Its birth can be traced to the Kansas-
Nebraska Act, which overturned the Missouri Compromise of 1820 and the Compromise of 1850
which had barred slavery in the territories. In opposition to this new legislation, antislavery
groups coalesced into the Republican Party. CONG. Q., GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS 179-84
(1975).
The Democratic Party came into existence around 1824 when the Jeffersonian, or Demo-
cratic-Republican Party broke apart and Andrew Jackson emerged as the leader of one of the
resulting splinter factions. In 1830, Jackson changed the name of his party from the Democratic-
Republican to the Democratic. Id at 179-80.
16. See X. KAYDEN & E. MAHE, THE PARTY GoEs ON: THE PERSISTENCE OF THE Two-
PARTY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 183 (1985) (noting the increased financial resources of
political parties).
17. The actual increase was from $84.5 million to $297.9 million for the Republican party,
and from $26.4 million to $98.5 million for the Democratic party. Federal Election Commn.
Press Release, 2, 4 (Dec. 5, 1985), reprinted in L. EPSTEIN, POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE AMERI-
CAN MOLD 351 (1986).
18. L. EPSTEIN, supra note 17, at 354.
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scientists fails to explain why party membership remains a sine qua
non for becoming elected to political office in the United States. After
all, if political parties are powerless and irrelevant, as often is claimed,
it is difficult to understand why candidates who attempt to run for
political office without the support of one of the major parties are al-
most always unsuccessful.
Political scientists generally consider political parties unsuccessful
because they view such parties as political organizations seeking influ-
ence over government. 19 Under this view, political parties "seek to
control the entire government by controlling its personnel."'20 In other
words, political scientists view political parties as organizations with
independent policy agendas that attempt to obtain substantive policy
outcomes.
This model of political parties is significantly different from, and
inferior to, the economic model of political parties developed initially
by Anthony Downs.21 The economic model views parties as interested
in getting candidates elected, not as interested in influencing policy
outcomes. The clients of the political parties are of course interested in
influencing outcomes, but the parties themselves simply are conduits
through which the policy preferences of these clients can find
expression.
It is the political scientists' misunderstanding of the nature of
political parties that has led them to conclude that such parties are
declining in influence. Their tests of the importance of political parties
measure the extent to which the parties are successful in controlling
government by controlling the electorate. Thus, for example, political
scientists point to the dramatic increase in so-called split-ticket vot-
ing22 as evidence of the decline of political parties. 23
Ticket splitting undoubtedly is on the increase.24 The proportion of
voters reporting that they have voted for different parties in presiden-
tial elections rose from 29% to 57% between 1920 and 1976. In addi-
tion, ticket splitting between presidential and House candidates
19. T. Lowi, INCOMPLETE CONQUEST: GOVERNING AMERICA 195 (2d ed. 1981).
20. Id.
21. A. DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957).
22. In split-ticket voting, Voters divide their votes among candidates of different parties run-
ning for various offices in the same election.
23. M. WATTENBERG, THE DECLINE OF POLITICAL PARTIES, 1952-1984, at 23 (1984).
24. T. Lowi, supra note 19, at 199 ("More American voters... split their tickets by voting
for candidates of one party for certain offices and then crossing over to vote for one or more
candidates of the opposing party.") (emphasis omitted); D. McKAY, AMERICAN POLITICs AND
SOCIETY 91 (1985) (ticket splitting on the rise due to weaker party identification, which produces
a "more fickle electorate").
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increased from 12% to 34% during this period. Similarly, ticket split-
ting between House and Senate candidates rose from 9% to 31%, and
the proportion of voters splitting their tickets in local elections rose
from 27% to 59%.25 Thus, contrary to common assumption, the in-
crease in ticket splitting is not simply a result of the fact that the Dem-
ocratic party has nominated presidential candidates that are more
liberal than the population as a whole. As Wattenberg has observed,
"Ticket-splitting has assumed massive proportions compared to the
rate just two decades ago, and only a small minority of the electorate
now believes that one should vote strictly on the basis of party
labels." 26
Political scientists have pointed to the increasing number of con-
tested primaries as further evidence of the decline of political parties.
Contested primaries are seen as evidence of the decline of political par-
ties because "a contested nomination is costly. Money that is spent on
campaigning in the primaries is no longer available to spend in the
general election against the opponent nominated by the other party." 27
Still, like the evidence that political campaigns are being organized
from outside the party organization, 28 and the evidence that presiden-
tial candidates are being selected from outside the formal party struc-
ture,29 the statistics about ticket splitting and contested primaries
provide evidence of party decline only if one defines political parties as
organizations that attempt to influence government. If, on the other
hand, one defines political parties as organizations that attempt to gal-
vanize shadow interest groups into effective political coalitions, then
one needs a different yardstick to measure the success or failure of
political parties.
Split-ticket voting reflects the fact that members of shadow interest
groups often identify more strongly with the candidates for office at
one level of government than with the candidates for office at another
level of government. Political parties serve as intermediaries between
shadow interest groups and politicians. This service may be more in
demand at some levels of government than at others.
Most voters will identify with shadow interest groups with regard
to some issues, and with formally organized interest groups with re-
gard to other issues. These same voters may not identify with either
sort of group with regard to other issues. Rational, self-interested vot-
25. M. WATrENBERG, supra note 23, at 20.
26. Id. at 23.
27. T. Lowi, supra note 19, at 206.
28. T. Lowi, supra note 10, at 71-73.
29. Id.
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ers will cast their votes so as to increase their overall welfare. This will
lead to voting along party lines for candidates running for political
offices that can further the goals of a particular shadow interest group,
and to voting that does not reflect party loyalty with respect to candi-
dates running for offices that wield particular influences over goals im-
portant to a special interest group. For example, an affluent voter who
supports U.S. aid to Israel consistently may vote for Democratic can-
didates to Congress because that party has been a more consistent sup-
porter of aid to Israel. But the same voter also may consistently vote
for the Republican candidate for President since the Republican is
more likely to veto congressional tax increases.
This voting pattern is consistent along party lines, but it produces
split-ticket voting. It also produces the voting pattern that allows the
voter to maximize the personal benefits associated with his vote. The
voter anticipates that the benefits to him from the President's veto of
new taxes will be greater than the costs associated with the President's
association with a political party that is relatively lukewarm on sup-
port to Israel. Similarly, the voter anticipates that having an additional
Democrat in Congress will not affect the probabilities of new taxes as
much as it will affect support for Israel.
Political scientists also point to the decline in party membership,30
and the lack of ideological cohesion within parties,31 as evidence of the
decline of political parties. If political parties are viewed as organiza-
tions seeking to represent the views of completely disorganized, atom-
istic voters, then these would be meaningful signals of party decline.
Lack of ideological cohesion would render the parties useless to indi-
vidual voters seeking to use the parties as low-cost signaling devices
over a range of issues. The decline in party membership does demon-
strate that the parties do not serve the interests of individual voters.
If, on the other hand, parties are viewed as indifferent to the pref-
erences of individual voters, but highly attuned to the preferences of
shadow interest groups, these statistics take on a new meaning. Unlike
individual voters, members of shadow interest groups do not care
about party cohesion. They care about how particular candidates
stand on particular issues, and are indifferent to the candidates' stance
30. D. McKAY, supra note 24, at 91 (showing that party identification, defined as the attach-
ment that individual voters have to particular parties, has been weakening steadily over the previ-
ous 30 years); N. NIE, S. VERBA & J. PETROCIK, THE CHANGING AMERICAN VOTER 57 (1979)
(arguing that voters hostile or indifferent to the dominant political parties had replaced loyal
party faithful by the 1970s).
31. G. POMPER, ELECTIONS IN AMERICA: CONTROL AND INFLUENCE IN DEMOCRATIC
POLITICS 168-73 (2d ed. 1980) (On most issues, American parties do not offer clearly different
choices. Both parties tend to support programs of proved popularity.).
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on other issues. These groups do not care about ideological coherence.
Consequently, ideological consistency is a cost to political parties be-
cause it forces them to take unpopular stands on issues in order to
prove their consistency. Thus, the lack of ideological coherence among
the political parties merely illustrates that such parties do not serve the
interests of the people at large. But this lack of ideological coherence
does not indicate that the parties serve no purpose in the political
process.
B. The Normative Twist
If one abandons the view that political parties are organizations
that attempt to influence government, and substitutes for it the view
that political parties are political organizations that serve the interests
of individual clients, it is harder to demonstrate that political parties
are on the decline. As noted above, the parties are flourishing finan-
cially, and the ability of politicians to win elections without their sup-
port is virtually nonexistent.
Not only do political scientists take the view that political parties
are unimportant as a descriptive matter, they also take the view that
their lack of power and influence is a serious problem as a normative
matter.32 An important school of thought within political science con-
siders the absence of strong political parties in the United States to be
a "serious weakness of the American political system ... and inter-
prets the decline of party organization and party identification as a
potential crisis in the current American political process." 33
Political scientists see parties as a "good thing" because they are
"large scale institutions that attract diffuse majority support and over-
come some of the collective action problems [inherent] in ... govern-
ment administration."'34 The premise underlying this normative theory
of political parties is that political parties are centralized institutions
that represent society as a whole rather than narrow interest group
constituencies. As organizations designed to effect the "mobilization of
majorities," political parties counteract the negative tendencies of nar-
32. See Fitts, The Vices of Virtue, A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the
Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1567, 1603-17 (1988).
33. Ia. at 1603-04; see also W. CROTrY, AMERICAN PARTIES IN DECLINE 281 (1984); see
generally THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEMS: STAGES OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (W. Cham-
bers & W. Burnham eds. 1967); N. NIE, S. VERBA & J. PETROCIK, supra note 30, at 73; D.
PRICE, BRINGING BACK THE PARTIES 105-07 (1984); Sundquist, Whither the American Party
System?, 88 POL. SC!. Q. 559, 576-79 (1973).
34. Fitts, Look Before You Leap, Some Cautionary Notes on Civic Republicanism, 97 YALE
L.J. 1651, 1656-57 (1988).
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row partisan politics. 35 In addition, democracies with strong and re-
sponsible political parties are seen as less likely to be swayed by
particular narrow special-interest groups because "the party structure
and the traditional party identification by the electorate can presuma-
bly permit leaders of the party to surmount the narrow interests of the
electorate on particular issues and more often adopt solutions that in-
ure to the overall benefit of the society."' 36
This analysis of political parties seems suspect for a number of rea-
sons. First, no evidence suggests that the preferences of the majority
are less reflected in the public policies of the United States, where
political parties are weak, than in the public policies of democracies
such as the United Kingdom, where political parties are considered to
be strong.37
Second, it seems highly doubtful that unorganized private citizens,
who cannot galvanize into effective political coalitions for the purposes
of attaining legislation from their elected representatives, will be more
successful at making themselves heard by political parties. The idea
that members of the House of Representatives serve narrow constitu-
encies, while representatives of political parties serve broader constitu-
encies is dubious. Strong political parties would not transform a seat in
the House of Representatives into a national office. As long as mem-
bers of the House are elected by particular districts, they will continue
to focus on interests that concern their constituents. 38 Attempts by
political parties to nominate candidates with views that run counter to
those of their constituents would fail.
Of course, members of the House can improve their constituents'
welfare by exhibiting strong party loyalty with regard to issues that do
not affect their constituents. By displaying party loyalty, members of
the House impress the party leadership, and thereby move up in the
party hierarchy and obtain more important committee assignments,
enabling the politician to provide still more benefits to his constituents
in the future. The long-run gains to a particular politician's constitu-
ents from having a representative who is an influential member of an
important committee may be so high that it is in the interests of that
politician to conform to the preferences of the existing party leader-
35. A. RANNEY, THE DOCTRINE OF RESPONSIBLE PARTY GOVERNMENT 10-11 (1962); E.
SCHATrSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 208 (1942).
36. Fitts, supra note 32, at 1607.
37. Cf. Page & Shapiro, Effects of Public Opinion on Policy, 77 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 175
(1983) (public opinion is often a proximate cause of policy in the United States).
38. Of course, the term "constituent" may be broadly defined to include not only a politi-
cian's geographic area, but also to include those groups to whom the politician supplies services
and resources. See Denzau & Munger, supra note 1, at 101-03.
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ship, even though doing so is against the short-run interests of certain
constituents.
Finally, and most fundamentally, the argument that political par-
ties would represent society as a whole rather than narrow self-inter-
ested constituencies is flawed because it is based on the false premise
that political parties are national, rather than local in orientation and
focus. In fact, political parties in the United States are loose amalga-
mations of very localized committees. As Professor Lowi has
observed:
The most important levels of real party organization have been the state,
the county, and, in larger cities, the assembly district or ward. And since
the elected party committees are large, party rules usually provide for a
smaller executive (or central) committee to make most of the actual
decisions....
Party organizations in the United States therefore turn out to be little
more than layerings of district committees with overlapping boundaries
and interlocking memberships. Most of the parties' regular workers are
drawn from these large committees. There have been a few party leaders
in the history of the United States whose power to coordinate districts
and committees was extremely effective. However, in recent years, if
there is any coordination at all, it is likely to come from the cooperation
of two or more party levels whose overlapping boundaries give them a
common candidate for a major office. 3 9
Political parties are loosely organized, multilayered organizations.
The premise that they are centralized institutions that might serve to
aggregate the interests of a national constituency is flawed because it is
based on a false assumption about the very nature of the political par-
ties. The parties are local, not national, political organizations, that
occasionally unite nationally for certain purposes, such as confirming
presidential nominees who, in fact, have been preselected in local
caucuses and primaries.
II. THE ECONOMISTS' APPROACH TO POLITICAL PARTIES
The role of political parties is as poorly understood among econo-
mists as it is among political scientists. Despite its general success in
explaining other aspects of American political life, the economic the-
ory of regulation contains no role for political parties. As Matt Lind-
say and Michael Maloney have observed, "The function of political
parties in democratic government has to date resisted successful incor-
poration into empirical models of politics. No economic theory of gov-
39. T. Lowi, supra note 19, at 196-97 (emphasis omitted).
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ernment has a truly satisfactory role for these institutions." 4
To economists, as well as to some political scientists, party affilia-
tions serve as brand names for politicians; party affiliations are "cheap
sources of information about which candidates are likely to best serve
the interests of voters or contributors. '41 Alternatively, economists
sometimes describe political parties as umbrella organizations that ser-
vice the common political goals of various interest groups. Under this
view, the Democrats represent one set of interest groups, and the
Republicans represent another. Neither explanation is convincing.
Perhaps the most common approach among economists is to ig-
nore political parties. In modeling the political process, economists
often disregard the role of political parties almost entirely. Congress is
viewed as a firm organized to supply legislation to special interest
groups in an efficient manner. At the heart of this approach is the
committee system, which facilitates the contracting process among
members of Congress, thereby assuring that the legislative deals that
are passed will be stable over time.42
A. The Missing Party: Congress as a Firm
The economic theory of legislation applies game theory and
microeconomic analysis to the production of law by legislatures, regu-
latory agencies and courts. An important branch of this theory por-
trays members of Congress as political brokers who seek to maximize
political support by matching "those who want a law or transfer the
most [as expressed by willingness to pay] with those who object the
least." 43 These politicians/brokers often play active roles in identifying
those interest groups best able to supply political support for particu-
lar issues, and in drafting legislation in such a way that the payers will
be unaware that they are subsidizing wealth transfers.44 In addition,
"politicians can be expected to organize their own interest groups...
in order to ameliorate the organizational costs and the free-rider
problems that confront individuals who seek to form groups capable of
40. Lindsay & Maloney, Party Politics and the Price of Payola, 26 ECON. INQUIRY 203
(1988).
41. Peltzman, Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting, 27 J.L. & ECON. 181, 197
(1984).
42. Weingast & Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress: Or Why Legislatures,
Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132, 143-44 (1988).
43. Tollison, supra note 1, at 343.
44. Macey, supra note 5, at 51; see also Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation
Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223, 232-33
(1986) (explaining how special-interest legislation that effectuates wealth transfers but is dis-
guised as having a public purpose is less costly politically than legislation that simply effectuates
a naked wealth transfer to a particular group).
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obtaining governmental wealth transfers. 45
Political parties play virtually no role in this model of the political
process. Individual legislators, without regard to party affiliation, are
viewed as members of a single organization - Congress - which
helps such legislators extract political support from interest groups
more effectively. In particular, as Barry Weingast and William Mar-
shall have observed, the theory of the firm can be employed to explain
how politicians use the internal organizational structure of Congress
to solve the enforcement problems that confront political support-
maximizing legislators who wish to obtain the political support from
interest groups that is necessary for their survival.46 Members of Con-
gress who wish to obtain passage of legislation must obtain the support
of their peers. This generally will be done by logrolling, the common
legislative process of giving support on one issue in exchange for re-
ceiving support on another issue. But politicians who seek to make
deals with one another face severe enforcement problems because per-
formance of logrolling agreements is not simultaneous. 47 The eco-
nomic theory of regulation shows that the organization of Congress is
specifically designed to solve these sorts of contracting problems in
order to maximize the political support that individual members can
obtain.48 In particular, the committee system within Congress, where
legislators retain control over the committees responsible for creating
the laws that benefit their own constituencies, solves the non-
simultaneity of performance problem by restricting access to the
agenda and therefore preventing ex post reneging.49
Note, however, that political parties play no role in this model.
The model posits only two classes of citizens: interest groups who de-
mand and receive wealth transfers, and voters who provide the re-
sources for such transfers through their fiscal support of transfer
programs that benefit interest groups. Yet, as explained below, politi-
cians can expand the scope of their political support by working
through political parties to establish contacts with shadow interest
groups. Unlike formally constituted interest groups, these quasi-inter-
est groups lack direct access to legislators. These groups use political
parties as intermediaries who broker the deals they make with politi-
cians. Once elected, politicians honor the campaign promises made to
these groups because the organizational structure of Congress makes it
45. Macey, supra note 5, at 51-52.
46. Weingast & Marshall, supra note 42, at 142-44.
47. Id. at 140-44.
48. Id. at 142.
49. Id. at 144.
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costly for them to renege. In other words, the organizational structure
of Congress enables politicians to make credible promises that they
will honor their commitments both to special interest groups and to
shadow interest groups. The political parties are an important conduit
through which the preferences of shadow interest groups are revealed
to the politicians. Thus, when determining the political costs and bene-
fits of a particular action, political parties are an important source of
information to politicians.
B. The Label Theory of Political Parties
The label theory of political parties posits that party labels provide
voters at least with some information, which the voters can receive
without expending time or money. 50 This theory has a surface plausi-
bility. Voters need a mechanism for economizing on information about
their elected representatives. Voters have poor incentives to expend
resources to become well-informed about their representatives. This is
because voters are making collective decisions that are subject to the
classic free-rider problems identified by Mancur Olson: individual vot-
ers cannot capture the full benefits of any gains they might obtain from
becoming well-informed about the political process. 51
The label theory is not particularly well specified. For example,
James Kau, Paul Rubin, Joseph Kalt, and Martin Zupan suggest that
party affiliation sends a low cost signal to voters about the ideological
orientation of a particular party member.52 This label, it is argued,
serves as a mechanism by which one can predict how politicians will
vote on issues that do not matter very much to their constituents. In
light of the lack of ideological cohesion among the parties, the label
theory is not a particularly convincing explanation for the role of
political parties.53 It is clear that "both major parties contain liberal
and conservative wings which give expression to these tastes by voting
together whenever ideology dictates in spite of party affiliation."' 54
Thus a particular politician's party affiliation is not, in and of itself, a
useful signal of the politician's ideological stance.
Sam Peltzman, on the other hand, takes the more plausible view
50. Peltzman, Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting, 27 J.L. & ECON. 181, 197
(1984).
51. M. OLsON, supra note 2, at 48.
52. Kau & Rubin, Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting, 22 J.L. &
ECON. 365 (1979); Kalt & Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74
AM. ECON. REv. 279, 284-85 (1984).
53. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of ideological cohesion
among parties).
54. Lindsay & Maloney, supra note 40, at 203.
(Vol. 89:1
HeinOnline -- 89 Mich. L. Rev. 16 1990-1991
Political Parties and Shadow Groups
that party labels signal voters about the positions favored by particular
candidates on particular issues, regardless of ideology. The problem
with this approach is that politicians can identify themselves politi-
cally in other, better ways. Organizations such as Common Cause, or
Americans for Democratic Action, are a better predictor than party
affiliation of the positions favored by particular candidates on particu-
lar issues. Indeed, Peltzman's own data show that party membership
is not a fundamental source of voting patterns for politicians.5 5 And,
while candidate endorsements by organizations like Common Cause
are not generally known, they are known to shadow interest groups
and to interested individuals.
C. The Umbrella Theory
Another approach to political parties, which might best be charac-
terized as the "umbrella theory," posits that political parties serve as a
"banner under which economic groups within each constituency pro-
mote their common interests. '5 6 This theory is problematic, however,
because political parties do not represent existing, well-organized in-
terest groups. As Lindsay and Maloney have observed, "[I]t is far
from clear which party represents the milk producers, the American
Medical Association, the sugar refiners, the truckers, the suppliers of
military hardware, banks and government bureaucrats. ' 57 These sorts
of interest groups simply do not need the organized political parties.
They can obtain direct access to particular candidates, and can moni-
tor and enforce the bargains they strike with the politicians they sup-
port. Put differently, "if membership in a party merely reflects
constituency interests, then there is no role for parties; they perform
no economic ftnction. 58
Thus, like the political scientists, the economists have been only
partially successful at explaining the role played by political parties in
American political life. The following section develops my theory of
political parties, which posits that political parties cater to the needs of
quasi-interest groups. Quasi-interest groups resemble formal interest
groups in that they are narrowly focused around particular issues. Yet,
they lack the organizational structure of firms, and therefore need
political parties to facilitate the process of contracting with interest
groups to exchange political support for political influence.
55. Peltzman, supra note 50, at 197.
56. Lindsay & Maloney, supra note 40, at 204.
57. Id.
58. Id. (emphasis in original).
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III. SHADOW INTEREST GROUPS AND POLITICAL PARTIES
Shadow interest groups occupy a middle ground between highly
disaggregated individuals (a group sometimes referred to as "consum-
ers at large") and highly organized special interest groups. Shadow
interest groups differ from disaggregated individuals who are unable
"to exercise any cogent influence over government decisions affecting
them."' 59 At the same time, shadow interest groups differ from real
interest groups because they are not organized as firms, and therefore
lack the ability to communicate among themselves and coordinate
their actions in a meaningful way.
Although shadow interest groups seek to influence policy out-
comes in certain areas, the costs to them of organizing into formal
interest groups generally are higher than the benefits that accrue from
achieving a formal organizational structure. Political parties enable
these shadow interest groups to achieve some of the benefits available
to formal interest groups despite their lack of a formal organizational
structure.
This Part begins by explaining why shadow interest groups do not
organize into formal interest groups. Section III.B then describes the
relationship between the political parties and the shadow interest
groups for whom they serve as intermediaries. I conclude this Part by
showing the relationship between the theory of political parties con-
tained in this article and the existing theories of political parties. I
argue that the best explanation of the modem role of political parties
is as organizers of shadow interest groups.
A. Shadow Interest Groups and Formal Interest Groups
Shadow interest groups do not form into formal interest groups for
two reasons. First, the marginal costs of organizing into a formal in-
terest group are significantly greater for shadow interest groups than
for formal interest groups which have already been created for some
other purpose. As such, it is more difficult for shadow interest groups
to overcome the collective action problems of free riding and rational
ignorance than it is for other groups.60
Second, it is costly for a shadow interest group to evolve into a
formal interest group because politicians can look to the formal inter-
est group as a source of transferable surplus. In other words, being
59. A. DowNs, supra note 21, at 255.
60. See generally M. OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS 36-74 (1982) (highlight-
ing the problem faced by interest groups that must bear the entire cost of social improvements
they prompt, while receiving only a small portion of the benefit).
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organized into a formal interest group is not unambiguously advanta-
geous for the group so organized. In fact, certain groups will find that
becoming organized into a formal interest group presents the danger
that any gains they obtain will be transferred away by regulators. Re-
maining a shadow interest group will be the optimal strategy for these
groups.
1. The Marginal Costs of Organization
The interest group theory of government is based on the premise
that different groups face different information and transaction costs
which allow some groups to organize and acquire information more
cheaply than others. According to traditional public choice theory,
politicians have an incentive to search for issues that transfer wealth to
easily identifiable groups from disaggregated individuals. Because
these disaggregated individuals face high transaction and information
costs, they are not likely to discover the effects of the issue on their
personal wealth.61
Politicians can gain political support at low cost by supporting this
sort of legislation since the beneficiaries will pay to obtain passage of
the legislation, while the interests that are harmed cannot impose
meaningful political costs on the politicians. Well-organized interest
groups enjoy the benefits of the wealth transfers generated by the polit-
ical process, while individual voters bear the costs of these transfers.
Organizing an interest group to engage in the collective action nec-
essary to obtain wealth transfers is both time-consuming and costly.
Organization costs for interest groups are like start-up costs for firms
generally. Once these costs are borne, they do not affect marginal
costs.62 Thus once a group is formed - even if it was formed for rea-
sons unrelated to lobbying - that group
will have a comparative advantage in seeking transfers and will therefore
be more successful in procuring transfers as a result. This is simply a
point about jointness in production. Some groups will be able to produce
political lobbying as a by-product of performing some other function,
thereby avoiding start-up costs for lobbying. There are many examples of
such groups in the economy, among which are labor unions, trade as-
sociations, corporations, and the like.6 3
Thus formal interest groups are most likely to be those groups for
whom the initial costs of organization are sunk. For these groups, the
61. Macey, supra note 44, at 229-30.
62. K McCORMICK & R. TOLLISON, POLITICIANS, LEGISLATION AND THE ECONOMY 17
(1981).
63. Id. (citation omitted).
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marginal cost of using the preexisting organizational form for lobbying
purposes will be low.
Clearly, however, groups other than those already organized desire
access to the political process. Certain ethnic and religious groups, for
example, are not formally organized into organizations capable of
mounting meaningful political campaigns. Yet people who identify
closely with these groups represent a valuable source of political sup-
port to politicians. The problem faced by the politicians is how to con-
tract with these groups; these groups lack a formal organizational
structure, and thus a readily identifiable leadership with whom politi-
cians can contract.
In addition, the members of shadow interest groups seek to iden-
tify politicians who will advance their interests once elected. In this
effort, shadow interest group members face a number of problems sim-
ilar to the collective action problems faced by individual voters who
wish to influence the political process. First, members of shadow inter-
est groups must identify politicians who, if elected, are willing to act
on their behalf. Next, they must determine if such politicians are via-
ble (i.e., electable) political candidates, often a difficult process. Fi-
nally, they must monitor the activities of these candidates once they
are elected in order to determine whether they in fact are acting con-
sistently with the welfare of the shadow interest groups that supported
them in the election.
Political parties can solve all of these problems for shadow interest
groups and the politicians who wish to deal with them. The primary
and caucus process, by which the parties choose political candidates,
serves the valuable function of identifying candidates who are viable.
In addition, political parties often will actively recruit potential candi-
dates whom they think are electable. 64 In this sense, the political par-
ties do serve as brand names. While a political party's nomination does
not contain concrete information about a candidate's ideological orien-
tation, like brand names generally, a party's nomination signals
shadow interest groups that a particular candidate is electable. This
adaptation of the label theory explains why candidates for political
office expend the considerable resources necessary to obtain a party's
nomination in a contested primary, even though it is likely cheaper to
get on the ballot by obtaining the signatures necessary under state law
to qualify as an independent. 65 Thus, the contested primary and con-
64. See, eg., Apple, 1990 Vote Will Test Power of G.O.P. in the Sun Belt, N.Y. Times, Feb.
25, 1990, at 26, col. 4 ("The Republicans have fared better than the Democrats in recruiting
candidates for the big Senate races.").
65. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 4, cl. I delegates to the states the power to set the time, place, and
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comitant party endorsement provide a signal to shadow interest
groups about which politicians are viable (electable) candidates in a
general election. Independents lack this advantage. Those who win a
party's nomination can obtain political support from individual mem-
bers of shadow interest groups who now have the assurance that the
candidate has a good chance of winning.
Finally, and perhaps most important, political parties are "exerting
greater discipline over their respective state and local organizations
and influencing those organizations through the services they pro-
vide.'" 66 In this way the parties can enforce the bargains they have
struck with shadow interest groups by monitoring the activities of the
ipdidual elected officials and controlling the flow of funds to individ-
ual politicians. This enables the parties to enforce the promises made
to shadow interest groups.
Political parties can be trusted to keep their bargains with shadow
interest groups because the parties are stable, long-standing organiza-
tions, with stronger incentives than individual politicians to maintain
reputations for keeping deals with shadow interest groups. This pat-
tern of repeat dealing with special interest groups serves to make polit-
ical parties' commitments credible.
This pattern of repeat dealing also makes the ties between shadow
interest groups and political parties extremely durable. Perhaps the
most striking example of the durability of the bond between shadow
interest groups and political parties can be seen in the voting patterns
of Jewish voters. As Lucy Dawidowicz trenchantly has observed:
[This pattern is] almost exactly the reverse of the national trend. That is
while almost 60 percent of Americans voted for President Reagan, more
than 60 percent of Jews voted for Walter Mondale (in the 1984 presiden-
tial election). The lopsided Jewish voting pattern resembled that of
blacks, the unemployed, and persons in households earning under
$10,000 a year even though Jews in no way resemble those groups or
manner of holding elections. Generally speaking, it is easier for a candidate with the endorse-
ment of one of the two major political parties to get on the ballot in a particular state. In New
York, for example, independently nominated candidates for Congress must obtain 3500 signa-
tures in order to secure a place on the ballot, while candidates with the endorsement of one of the
two parties need only 1250. Similarly, candidates for the state senate who are not affiliated with
either major party must obtain 3000 signatures, while candidates with the support of the Repub-
licans or the Democrats need only 1000 signatures. T. Lowi & B. GINSBURG, AMERICAN Gov-
ERNMENT, FREEDOM AND POWER 508 (1990).
While it is costlier for candidates to obtain the additional signatures necessary to win a place
on the ballot of a major party, it is extremely unlikely that the additional costs of obtaining these
signatures is as high as the costs of mounting a successful campaign to win a contested primary.
Garnering the extra signatures requires recruiting or paying additional solicitors; a contested
primary frequently involves print, radio, or television advertising in addition to a campaigning
schedule.
66. Cotter & Bibby, supra note 9, at 2.
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share their social and political interests.67
The reason that Jews have not realigned their voting patterns so as to
give expression to the full range of their social, political and economic
concerns is that they have a long-standing relationship with the Dem-
ocratic party, and it would be costly to break that tie. Thus despite the
fact that the Democratic party supports many policies, such as wealth
redistribution and employment quotas, that are anathema to many
Jews, 68 the Jewish vote has been remarkably loyal to the Democrats.
2. Rent Extraction and Shadow Interest Groups
The relationship between a political party and a shadow interest
group can be likened to the relationship between two firms in a long
term, relational contract. Politicians searching for political support
from organized interest groups can obtain such support in one of two
ways. First, they can promise a particular group that they will press
for regulations favorable to those groups. This process is known as
"rent creation," and the groups that benefit from the process are "rent
seekers." 69 By this process of rent creation, special interest groups are
thought to benefit from the regulatory process. As Fred McChesney
has pointed out, however, politicians are capable not only of creating
rents for interest groups, they also are capable of extracting rents by
threatening to regulate in ways that will be costly to those groups.70
This extraction takes place because specific and expropriable capital is
an inevitable by-product of the economic activities of firms, including
organized interest groups. Over time these firms and groups invest in
resources that have particular applications to certain uses. Politicians,
knowing that the owners of these customized resources will suffer
losses if the resources are not used for their intended purposes, can
threaten to regulate in ways that will expropriate the specific and ex-
propriable capital of these interest groups unless side payments are
made for regulatory forbearance. For example, advertising creates a
reservoir of good will for a product or service that enables firms to
charge higher prices for those products and services. After a firm
makes an investment in advertising, politicians can threaten to appro-
67. Dawidowicz, Politics, the Jews and the '84 Election, 73 COMMENTARY, Feb. 1985, at 25,
29.
68. See id at 29-30.
69. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation,
16 . LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987); see also Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups
for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983); Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of
Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J.
ECON. MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971).
70. McChesney, supra note 69, at 103.
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priate this investment by imposing price ceilings or by imposing mini-
mum quality standards on all firms.
Being organized into a special interest group lowers the politicians'
transactions costs of transferring the organized group's own surplus.71
Consequently, a second reason why groups that are unified around a
particular interest may not choose to organize into formal coalitions is
because they face the possibility of rent extraction if they do so. The
political parties permit shadow interest groups to obtain gains by trad-
ing political support for preferential treatment by politicians while
avoiding the specter of rent extraction.
B. Political Parties and Shadow Interest Groups
Political parties serve as intermediaries between shadow interest
groups and politicians. Political parties convey to politicians informa-
tion about the policy preferences of shadow interest groups. They also
help politicians in their appeals to these groups by establishing mailing
lists, donor lists and other contact points with group members.
Politicians need political parties to serve in the role of in-
termediaries because it is difficult for politicians to forge their own
relationships with shadow interest groups. Because shadow interest
groups lack a formal organizational structure, it is costly for politi-
cians to identify and communicate with the individual members. But,
unlike politicians, political parties develop longstanding ties to these
groups that permit such groups to identify with the politicians nomi-
nated by the party.
In addition, and perhaps most important, the political parties en-
able politicians to enter into relational contracts with members of
shadow interest groups. 72 These relational contracts are "highly inter-
active.., arrangements [where] a complete contingent contract may
not be... feasible."' 73 The enforcement problems that might otherwise
be associated with an open-ended and unspecified contractual arrange-
ment are mitigated by the pattern of repeat dealing between shadow
interest groups and political parties. This pattern of repeat dealing
makes it possible for a shadow interest group to trust a particular
party, despite the fact that they might not trust the individual politi-
cians within the party. It is not surprising that the major political par-
ties consistently have taken positions that seem to align them with the
shadow interest groups with whom they are associated:
71. McChesney, Transferable Surplus and Interest.Group Organization in a Coasian Model of
Regulation, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (forthcoming Jan. 1991).
72. Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089 (1981).
73. Id at 1090.
October 1990]
HeinOnline -- 89 Mich. L. Rev. 23 1990-1991
Michigan Law Review
[T]he national teadership of the Republican party supports increased
military spending, cuts in social programs, tax relief for middle- and up-
per-income voters, tax incentives to business, and the "social agenda"
backed by members of conservative religious denominations. The na-
tional Democratic leadership, on the other hand, supports expanded so-
cial welfare spending, cuts in military spending, increased regulation of
business, and a variety of consumer and environmental programs. These
differences reflect... differences in the core constituencies to which the
parties seek to appeal. 74
On the basis of the above description, one might argue that there is
no meaningful distinction between the heterogenous, unorganized
group known as voters, on the one hand, and shadow interest groups
on the other. Unlike members of shadow interest groups, however,
individual, disaggregated voters are plagued with rational ignorance
problems that make it irrational for them to expend the resources nec-
essary to obtain information about the details of the political process
as it relates to a wide range of issues. While members of shadow inter-
est groups find it irrational to become informed about most issues,
they do find it in their interests to become informed about a certain
issue or subset of issues.
IV. COMMITMENT TO POLITICAL PARTIES AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR
COMMITMENT TO IDEOLOGY
As discussed above, political parties do not serve the interests of
disaggregated voters by notifying them of the ideological positions
held by candidates. 75 Instead, party labels serve the interests of
shadow interest groups by providing them with low cost information
about whether a particular candidate is electable. In this context the
label theory seems to make sense.
As for the umbrella theory,76 it is not coincidental that political
parties appear to serve as a banner for a variety of unrelated interest
group constituencies. The political parties serve as intermediaries be-
tween interest groups and politicians for a variety of shadow interest
groups. As intermediaries, the political parties are not concerned that
74. T. Lowi & B. GINSBERG, supra note 65, at 499. The point being made here should not be
confused with the argument made above against the "umbrella" theory. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 56-58. The groups described by Lowi and Ginsberg are shadow interest groups. By
contrast, the umbrella theory predicts that existing, well organized interest groups will identify
with political parties. But, as pointed out above, well organized groups, unlike shadow groups, do
not need political parties to serve as brokers between themselves and politicians. See supra text
accompanying notes 57-58.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55; see also T. LowI & B. GINSBERG, supra note
65, at 499 ("Even in the late 1960s when American society was unusually polarized, the Demo-
cratic and Republican candidates stood for about the same things.").
76. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
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the set of issues they support does not reflect a consistent ideological
pattern.
For politicians, therefore, party loyalty serves as a substitute for
ideological commitment. Because current voters typically cannot actu-
ally bind the politicians for whom they vote to particular courses of
action, problems of enforcement inevitably arise. A reputation for ide-
ological commitment to certain positions "serves the same function in
political exchange that brand-name capital serves in market transac-
tions."' 77 A corollary is that political competition inevitably imparts an
ideological tenor to campaigning as each candidate attempts to con-
vince the voters that he is personally committed to a particular set of
voters.78 Formal interest groups are likely to support candidates for
public office who have a strong ideological commitment that coincides
with the preferences of the interest group. The politicians' ideological
commitment is a form of self-bonding that makes it less likely that the
politician will deviate from the position to which he has precommitted
on the basis of his ideology. 79
Nevertheless, commitment to a particular ideology is costly be-
cause it requires a measure of consistency, forcing politicians to em-
brace positions that are costly in the near term. Thus the issue is
whether the cost of opportunism, which comes in the form of lower
credibility with political supporters, is worth the benefits, which come
in the form of promised political support from the profiting groups.
A different precommitment strategy for politicians is to develop a
reputation for party loyalty rather than for ideological commitment.
The very high rates at which certain members of both parties vote
with the party majority indicates that for at least some politicians the
benefits of developing a reputation for party loyalty outweigh the
costs.8 0 Yet, like ideological voting, party loyalty is costly. To main-
tain a reputation for party loyalty, a politician must vote with her
party even when she would obtain short term benefits from deviating
from the party line.
A strategy of committing to follow the majority position of a par-
ticular party serves as a substitute for ideological commitment. A par-
ticular politician must decide whether the net benefits from a strategy
77. Dougan & Munger, The Rationality of Ideology, 32 J.L. & EcON. 119, 125 (1989).
78. Id. at 120-30.
79. Id.
80. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., CONGRESSIONAL ROLL CALL 1986, at 31-C.
In the House of Representatives during 1986, 11 Democrats and 9 Republicans voted with their
party majority and against the majority of the other party in at least 93% of the votes cast. In the
Senate, 4 Democrats and 7 Republicans voted with their party majority at least 91% of the time.
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of party loyalty are greater than or less than the net benefits from a
strategy of ideological commitment. In this context, the fact that the
positions of the political parties on various issues are eclectic and inco-
herent, and do not reflect a consistent ideological pattern, is a virtue
rather than a vice. The parties' lack of a consistent ideology allows
politicians to make credible precommitments to shadow interest
groups without being trapped into making politically costly commit-
ments on side issues for the sake of proving ideological consistency.
Nevertheless, a reputation for loyalty to a political party is not a
perfect substitute for a reputation for ideological commitment as a
bonding device. Members of shadow interest groups are likely to be-
lieve that a commitment to a particular ideology is a more credible
bond than a commitment to party, since the societal pressures against
departing from one's ideology are higher than the societal pressures
against deviating from the party line. Nonetheless, a reputation for
commitment to a particular political party can be a powerful bonding
device. A politician who has developed such a reputation often will
find that the short term benefits from deviating from the party line will
be lower than the long term costs, which come in the form of de-
creased credibility. Such decreased credibility means that both shadow
interest groups and formal interest groups will be less willing to pro-
vide political support for a promise of future regulatory favors.
Not surprisingly, the politicians most likely to deviate from the
positions taken by their own party are Southern Democrats and
Northern Republicans. The cost of party loyalty to these politicians is
very high since they represent districts in which a majority of voters
embrace ideologies that place them in frequent opposition to the posi-
tions taken by their representatives' parties.81
The thesis that a reputation for strong political party affiliation is a
substitute for a reputation for ideological commitment as an ex ante
bonding strategy for politicians is empirically testable. If voters believe
that ex post reneging by politicians is a problem, then the longer the
term of office being contested, the bigger the problem is likely to be in
the minds of voters.82 This implies that party affiliation should be
more important in Senate races than in House races. The available
evidence supports this result. Alan Abramovitz has found that "party
identification had a greater impact on (voters') evaluations of Senate
81. Thus it is not surprising that six of the seven Senate Democrats who most consistently
voted against their party majority in 1986 were from the South (the seventh was from Nebraska),
while six of the seven Senate Republicans who most consistently voted against their party major-
ity were from liberal states, le., Connecticut, Pennsylvania (two), North Dakota, and Oregon
(two). I.
82. Dougan & Munger, supra note 77, at 125.
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candidates than on (voters') evaluations of House candidates. s83 Inter-
estingly, while party affiliation was more important to voters in Senate
races than in House races, party affiliation was a significant factor in
voters' decisions about candidates for both chambers.84 Moreover,
party identification was considered by voters to be more significant
than ideological orientation in both the House and the Senate.85
V. THE POLITICAL SCIENTISTS' NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE
My theory also casts doubt on the political scientists' view that
political parties promote majority rule by "affording greater represen-
tation to diffuse majority sentiments, ' 86 and by generating a "counter-
vailing collective power on behalf of the many individually powerless
against the relatively few who are individually - or organizationally
- powerful."'87 Although political parties do not appear to promote
civic virtue in government as some have claimed, they may neverthe-
less serve a useful function in a representative democracy.
Viewed from a pluralist rather than a republican perspective, polit-
ical parties can serve as an important counterweight to organized in-
terest groups. That is, to the extent that the preferences of the shadow
interest groups affiliated with the political parties are opposed to the
preferences of the formally organized interest groups, the ability of
political parties to mobilize such shadow interest groups enables these
groups to serve as countervailing forces to formal interest groups.
This will not always be the case. Like formally organized interest
groups, politicians will search for issues that transfer wealth from dif-
fuse voters to shadow interest groups. They will try to avoid issues
that put shadow interest groups into direct conflict with formal inter-
est groups because the costs associated with such outcomes will be
high. In other words, political scientists and their followers are wrong
to suggest that strong political parties will promote civic virtue and
republicanism. Still, they may be correct in thinking that shadow in-
83. Abramovitz, A Comparison of Voting for U.S. Senator and Representative in 1978, at 74
AM. POL. Sci. REv. 633 (1980).
84. See ia at 636, Figure 1. The standardized regression coefficient for party identification
was 0.148 for House candidates, and 0.263 for Senate candidates. Standardized regression coeffi-
cients are used to facilitate comparisons between regression coefficients within a single equation.
A standardized regression coefficient shows the change in the mean response as measured in
units of standard deviations when all other independent variables are held constant. J. NETER &
W. WASSERMAN, APPLIED LINEAR STATISTICAL MODELS: REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF VARI-
ANCE, AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS 278-68 (1974).
85. Id.
86. Fitts, supra note 32, at 1607.
87. W. BURNHAM, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN POLITICS
133 (1970).
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terest groups will serve as a check on organized interest groups. The
meta-question is whether the ability of political parties to organize
shadow interest groups is beneficial on balance. On the positive side of
the equation is the ability of political parties and shadow interest
groups to check formal interest groups. On the negative side is the
ability of such groups to transfer wealth from the population as a
whole to themselves. Thus, the question of whether the social benefits
of political parties outweigh the social costs has no a priori answer.
The question is empirical.
CONCLUSION
For some time now both political scientists and economists have
been casting about for a useful explanation of the role of political par-
ties in American political life. The existence of these parties does not
fit easily into sophisticated, interest group dominated models of the
political process. On the one hand, formal interest groups do not ap-
pear to need political parties because these groups already enjoy access
to politicians. In addition, such groups can, at low cost, monitor and
enforce the deals they strike with legislators. On the other hand,
neither of the two major political parties appears to have any particu-
lar use for highly unorganized, disaggregated voters who are unable to
supply political support in any meaningful way.
The role of the political parties seems clear, however, when
shadow interest groups are introduced into the calculus. Shadow inter-
est groups have the resources and the inclination to provide political
support to politicians, but they need an intermediary to reduce the
costs of monitoring the politicians with whom they deal. Political par-
ties are uniquely suited to meet the needs of these groups. The parties
recruit and screen potential candidates, inform them about the prefer-
ences of shadow interest groups, and monitor and evaluate the per-
formance of the candidates once they are elected. The ability of
political parties to perform these services gives shadow interest groups
the ability to express themselves in the political process without sub-
jecting themselves to the specter of rent extraction.
My theory of political parties casts doubt on the normative conclu-
sions of political scientists who see the parties as an important mecha-
nism for promoting majority rule in the United States. There is no
particular reason to believe that the policy preferences of shadow in-
terest groups are any broader or virtuous than the views of formally
organized interest groups. The only distinction between shadow inter-
est groups and formal interest groups is in their respective choice of
organizational form. On the other hand, the presence of a robust two-
[Vol. 89:1
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party system does promote the ability of certain factions to make
themselves heard in the political process. In an age in which the power
of well organized special interest groups seems to be continually on the
rise, healthy political parties serve as a check on their activities by
mobilizing shadow interest groups to oppose them.
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